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Abstract There continues to be legal invisibility of lesbians as sexual beings; in
particular, for those lesbians who engage in BDSM. A cursory glance at work both
within and outside of the academy gives the impression of increased social and legal
acceptability for those who engage in BDSM. However, I suggest that this accep-
tance is illusory and that instead, gay men who engage in BDSM experience
increased legal supervision and increased invisibility for lesbians. These issues are
examined in the context of two seemingly disparate legal events. The first is the
30 year anniversary of Operation Spanner and the second is the introduction of the
Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2014. Amongst other things, the 2014
Regulations criminalise the portrayal of female ejaculation (but not male). Given
this criminalisation of certain kinds of female sexual pleasure, the potentiality to
significantly adversely impact upon lesbians is clear. 2017 will be the 30 year
anniversary of Operation Spanner and the subsequent focus has been primarily upon
gay male BDSM. I speculate as to the possible legal reaction(s) to a lesbian
‘spanner’ BDSM event. I speculate as to the legal reactions to an all-female BDSM
dungeon.
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Introduction
This article argues that there continues to be legal invisibility of lesbians as sexual
beings and in particular, for those lesbians who engage in BDSM (bondage and
discipline, sadism and masochism). This legal invisibility leads to a lack of legal
clarity and uncertainty for lesbians who engage in BDSM. These issues are
examined in the context of two seemingly disparate legal events, separated by
nearly 30 years. The first is Operation Spanner, the name given to a police
investigation in 1987, which was prompted by the chance finding of videotapes of
consensual BDSM activities. 2017 will be the 30 year anniversary of Operation
Spanner. The men were arrested and charged, with a range of offences, primarily
under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The second of the legal events, is
the Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2014. These Regulations apply to all
Video on Demand (VoD), content created in the UK and amongst other things, they
criminalise the portrayal of female ejaculation (but not male). Given that the
portrayal of certain kinds of female sexual pleasure is now a criminal offence, this
has the potentiality to significantly adversely impact upon lesbians who film the
BDSM they engage in. The subsequent Statutory activity; case law and academic
attention since Operation Spanner, have focussed primarily upon gay male BDSM
and how this activity is discriminated against in comparison to heterosexual BDSM.
It is clear from R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (still the leading authority on this issue),
and subsequent case law, that for gay men, it is not legally possible to consent to
sadomasochistic harm. Much of the literature that deals with this issue correctly
points to an exclusionary; demonizing; criminalising and discriminating legal
approach to gay male BDSM. In the 30 years of analysis since Operation Spanner,
there has been a significant amount of analysis on the subject and a significant
amount a work done on the repercussions of Spanner, of R v Brown, and in the area
of consent to BDSM. However, the vast majority of this literature has either
expressly or implicitly concerned gay men or heterosexual women. Moran, for
example comments that R v Brown works to ‘‘re-criminalize sexual relations
between gay men’’ (Moran 1996: 190). There has not been a similar volume of
scholastic research conducted which has examined these issues specifically from a
lesbian perspective. This article seeks to re-balance this unequal focus. In so doing, I
start with locating the relative legal invisibility of lesbians who engage in BDSM
including an examination of the socio-legal consequences of invisibility for women
who engage in BDSM with other women. Given that ‘‘BDSM appears to be on the
cusp of a new understanding’’ (Chatterjee 2012: 739), I then develop this into
describing and analysing how the law has developed to apply to women who engage
in BDSM, with other women.1 I ask how lesbians who engage in BDSM experience
the legal gaze and what might be some of the consequences might be for lesbians
who engage in BDSM? What should be the response to these developments
1 There is no commonly accepted definition of what constitutes BDSM behaviour. Certain characteristics
seem to be common to the practice, including negotiated, consensual infliction of pain experienced by the
parties as pleasurable, and by using fantasy and role-playing and fetishistic elements, such as dress and




regarding the legal specificity of lesbian BDSM? I speculate as to the possible legal
reaction(s) to a fictitious police raid on a lesbian only BDSM event in which the
activities were filmed and the results posted as VoD. How might the law react if the
people in the BDSM dungeon are all women?2 Would they be treated the same as
the men in R v Brown and what might that tell us about the operation of legal
norms? My aim is to advance an important perspective; namely, that of a more
nuanced approach to lesbian sexual citizenship. I conclude by suggesting that the
lesbians in the dungeon will be treated by law as women (not specifically lesbians),
who have offended against the criminal law and their expected gender performa-
tivity. I further suggest that lesbian sex acts are investigated and prosecuted etc., not
because they are lesbians sex acts but because of the perceived gender deviance.
Invisibility of Lesbians
When the Centre for Disease Control in America was asked why it had not carried
out any research on woman-to-woman transmission of HIV, the reply was that
‘‘Lesbians don’t have much sex’’ (Smith 1992: 207). This is an illustration that
lesbian invisibility is not just due to lesbians as subjects being invisible, but also that
they are invisible as sexual subjects. Given that in the past lesbians have been
‘‘deprived of a sexual language by a predominantly male culture’’ (Plummer 1992:
xvii), how could the discourse post R v Brown be viewed from a lesbian
perspective? Does the introduction of the Audiovisual Media Services Regulations
2014 provide yet more evidence that lesbian sexuality is legally invisible and
irrelevant? Lesbian identities and experiences have a long cultural history, although
unfortunately, much of that history has been undocumented, concealed or invisible
(Donoghue 1993: Faderman 1985). In a legal context, those identities and
experiences have only a recent visible history, having been rendered invisible by,
and displaced from, legal culture. Indeed, the first time that the word ‘lesbian’
appeared in a British statute was in relation to the notorious s.28 of the Local
Government Act 1988. Thus, for many years, the identity of the lesbian was an
invisible identity, ‘‘for most of the nineteenth century in England, the word ‘lesbian’
was virtually unknown’’ (Zimmerman 2000). It still is. I am not of course,
suggesting that lesbians should be equally demonised and criminalised in a race to
the bottom (forgive the pun), with gay men, but it is also clear that ‘‘exclusion of
lesbian sexuality from official disclosure on homosexuality constitutes a thoroughly
anti-lesbian strategy’’ (Smith 1992: 210). Consequently, as Smyth argues, lesbians
should work to ensure that:
We are not simply tagged on to equality campaigns in connection with
procreation and the family … we have never had the safety to take the same
public space for sexual adventures as gay men, yet we solicit, procure,
indecently assault and fuck each other in SM scenarios and want the right to be
2 It might be that in a room full of women engaging in BDSM, not all of them would identify as lesbian,
however, I am assuming that (a) of those that do identify a sexual orientation, the majority will identify as
lesbian and (b) that the law will assume a lesbian identity of the women.
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acknowledged for our sex and sexuality, just as gay men rightly demand
(Smyth 1990: 64).
Smyth’s concerns echo a tendency in the literature to use a discourse which
speaks of lesbians as if they belong in the category of ‘homosexual’, which is an
implicitly male construct. Much of the literature which discusses attitudes towards
homosexuality impliedly uses the category of homosexual to include lesbians.
However, this is problematic as although the term ‘homosexual’ or ‘gay’ might be
intended as a gender-neutral term, ‘‘it functions more often than not as a masculine
signifier’’ (Thompson 2002: 34–35). The implications of this conflation mean that
lesbians are rendered ‘invisible as homosexuals while simultaneously included in
the category for the purposes of regulating identity (Thompson 2002: 34–35).
In writing this article, there were several methodological impediments and
concerns. The first was in locating relevant material and I was not surprised by this
difficulty. Numerous searches across several platforms turned up sources which
were overwhelmingly ‘lesbianandgaymen’ (as if it is one word); written from a gay
(male); or (heterosexual) feminist perspective. There were few articles which dealt
solely with lesbians, the few that did so were mainly about lesbians becoming
mothers or losing/gaining access to their children or fertility services resulting in the
‘‘legal and familial discourse became the main ones through which lesbianism was
expressed’’ (Shadmi 2008: 315). Examples of the few exceptions to this are Hornsby
and Calhoun (Calhoun 1995). Hornsby, for example, argues that within feminism,
lesbian sadomasochism, if thought of at all, is thought as antithetical to feminism
(Hornsby 2008: 61–72). Deckha, for example, admits to excluding lesbian BDSM as
including lesbian BDSM made her theories too convoluted to see. Deckha suggests
that heterosexual women who engage in BDSM have a ‘‘unique symbolic meaning
of heterosexual S/M for feminists seeking to resist male dominance and
exploitation’’ (Deckha 2007: 427). This suggests that lesbians are not subject to
male dominance and exploitation. Boryczka, in exploring how virtue and vice have
been used as a discursive political tool to create a class of suspect citizens, argues
that lesbians who engaged in BDSM practices have been accused of replicating ‘‘the
very masculine power dynamics used to perpetuate women’s oppression’’
(Boryczka 2012: 108).
These methodological constraints and concerns were as frustrating as they were
illuminating. In order to write about the extent to which lesbians are viewed as
sexual beings, then by necessity, ‘the lesbian’ is required to exist as a subject.
Furthermore, in order to write about lesbian BDSM, she must be considered as a
sexual subject. The relative fruitlessness of my search clearly indicates that within
the academy and within the criminal law, lesbians do not occupy (much) discursive
space and are majoratively, not considered sexual beings. I contend that the lesbian
must, and needs, to exist as a visible discursive category as otherwise she is
conceptualised as existing somewhere between a variant of a heterosexual women
or a gay man. If, as post structuralism and queer theory suggests, there is no subject,
the lesbian consequently disappears and becomes subsumed and compromised so
consistently and so effectively as to blink out of experiential existence. How then,
might this conundrum be tackled? One possible solution to post-structuralist
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disappearance is to accept that whilst identities can be thought of as fluid, variable,
shifting, changing and that this identity construction is also ‘‘arbitrary, unstable and
exclusionary’’, these identities can simultaneously exist (Plummer 2002: 237).
Whilst therefore, lesbian identity might very well be an identity that is constantly in
flux and ‘‘in progress’’ (Hall 1996: 6), it is also an identity that can necessarily, and
effectively, provide a site of resistance to dominant normative hetero-patriarchal
identity. What is important however is that it should be a visible identity.
Visibility however, is not unproblematic, and the problematic nature of lesbian
visibility stems from two main, but interrelated issues. The first relates to the idea of
sexuality being both private and public. It is not unreasonable to suggest that most
individuals (whether BDSM practitioners or not), wish to keep their sex lives
private. However, those individuals who are positioned by law as ‘deviant’, often
simultaneously want legal (and therefore) public recognition of the ‘right to a
private life’. The notion of wanting a ‘right’ to privacy has its origins in individuals
revisiting the intrusion of the State ‘abuses of governmental authority’ (Wood and
Lodge 2013: 650). This right however, has not been extended to those who are
considered by the State to be ‘sexually deviant’, meaning that ‘many of the same
people who seek to politicise what has been too heavily privatised, also wish to
affirm a ‘right to privacy’ (Weeks 1992). For lesbians, this entails the duality of
desiring to occupy definitive discursive space as a visible lesbian, and simultane-
ously desiring to maintain a ‘private life’. Arguably therefore, this duality of desire
leads to an occupation of ‘‘negative semantic space’’ (Frye 1983: 173). The
subordination of lesbians by the epistemic combined with the desire to have a
private sex life, contributes to lesbian invisibility. The introduction of the
Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2014 is an illustration of lesbians
occupying negative sematic space (they are not mentioned in the Regulations),
but simultaneously directly affected by the Regulations. They are both visible and
invisible. The second issue relates to a nervousness some lesbians of publically
acknowledging any sexuality which was (and is), regarded as ‘deviant’, leading to a
conformity to heteronormative values of sexual expression. Thus the rendering of
lesbians as invisible can sometimes come from lesbians themselves. As explained
by Pilcher and Whelehan, ‘‘so nervous were early radical lesbian feminists of
‘miming’ heterosexuality in any way, there was a virtual taboo until the late 1980s
on the discussion of practices or identities which were thought to reflect back to
heterosexuality—for example, butch and femme or SM (sadomasochism)’’ (Pilcher
and Whelehan 2004: 71). Further examples include a refusal by the Lesbian Archive
in London to refuse to stock material relating to ‘‘the lesbian s/m culture’’ (Plummer
1992: 211).3 Exclusion has also come from other feminists, for example, the first
president of the American pressure group, National Organisation for Women
(NOW), stated that lesbian issues were not ‘‘central to feminist concerns and that
lesbians would put the movement in jeopardy by coupling feminist with sexual
deviants’’ (Seidman et al. 2006: 490). Part of the reason for this invisibility is that
BDSM is regarded as violence, not sex; further, that the concepts of ‘sex’;
‘violence’ and BDSM are male.
3 The Lesbian Archives Collective in London was transferred to Glasgow Women’s Library in 1995.
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Violence Not Sex?
Whilst I maintain that it is necessary to maintain a discursive space of ‘lesbian’, I
am also aware that it is necessary to continue to resist the operation of normative
heterosexual discourse upon the lesbian subject. The Spanner case is illustrative of
the law’s desire to categorise BDSM as violence, not sex (Bell and Valentine 1995:
284), indeed, according to Lord Templeman ‘‘society is entitled and bound to
protect itself against a cult of violence’’ (R v Brown: 84). It is not just the judges
who express such concerns. For some, BDSM merely reproduces the violence that
marks patriarchy’s hold over the performance of femininity (Hopple 1996). For
others, sexuality, when expressed in a lesbian BDSM context is a cultural
production and a ‘‘variation of violence against women which apes the worst of
patriarchy’’ (O’Sullivan 1999: 101). BDSM is therefore illustrative of two
significant concerns in law and society; how to regulate and control sex and
violence. These concerns have important consequences therefore, when it comes to
a legal gaze which constructs violence committed by women as different from the
violence committed by men. Further, the expression of female sexuality receives
different legal attention than does the expression of male sexuality. Women, who
therefore engage in an activity which to them is sexual, but to law is violence, may
very well be subjected to different normative control. In R v Brown, the disciplinary
operation of law’s moral disapprobation was directed primarily at protecting society
from the ‘violence’ of possible HIV infection and was therefore directed at their
sexual behaviour, not their sexual orientation (Sedgwick 1990). Similarly, the
Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2014 were introduced in order to protect
those who are deemed vulnerable (in this instance, minors), from accessing material
which might be considered ‘harmful.’ This justification echoes Cowan’s argument
that it is the notion of vulnerability which is increasingly relied upon to justify
enhanced criminal penalties (Cowan 2012). Further, the justification for section 63
of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, was, according the Government,
due to concerns regarding the ‘sexual torture’ offences committed in R v Brown.
Given this, it is not unreasonable to argue that those male bodies who engage in
BDSM are treated differently by law and society than female bodies who engage in
BDSM. In this context therefore, the performance of sex is male and the expression
of sexuality in the form of BDSM is also male.
It might be helpful at this juncture to explore what is meant by this statement. To
state that most BDSM is male is to argue that it is formed by, and through, the lens
of patriarchal male desire. As mentioned above, the leading case in this area is still
the House of Lords decision in R v Brown, Lucas, Jaggard, Laskey and Carter,
[1993] 2 All ER 75 which situated sadomasochistic activities as constituting
unlawful assault. The facts are well known; five gay men were charged with assault
occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the
Person Act 1861, and unlawful wounding contrary to section 20 of the same Act.




Where A wounds or assaults B occasioning him actual bodily harm in the
course of a sadomasochistic encounter, does the prosecution have to prove
lack of consent on the part of B before they can establish A’s guilt under
section 20 or section 47 of the Offences Against the person Act 1861?’ (R v
Brown: 559).
By a split decision (three to two), the House of Lords upheld the original
conviction stating that ‘‘it would not be in the public interest that deliberate
infliction of actual bodily harm during the course of homosexual sadomasochistic
activities should be held to be lawful.’’ (R v Brown per Jauncey LJ: 574). Although
Lord Templeman acknowledged that consent can be a defence to infliction of bodily
harm during activities such as sporting events, he was quite clear that consensual
BDSM activity was not something that could be consented to. The case was
reviewed by the European Court of Human Rights in 1997 in Laskey, Jaggard and
Brown v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 39. The Court held that whilst the law
prohibiting consensual sadomasochistic activity did violate the right to respect for
one’s private life under Article 8(1), the interference was justified as necessary in a
democratic society for the protection of health and the interests of others. In
addition, the Court also stated that national governments were entitled to criminalise
consensual infliction of harm. The European Court accepted that although the acts
described in this case could be considered consensual, a prosecution was justified
and did not constitute a violation of the defendants’ private life because the ‘‘sado-
masochistic activities involved a significant degree of injury or wounding which
could not be characterised as trifling or transient’’. As I point out later, this runs
contrary to John Stuart Mills’ argument that there can be no state interference or
criminal repercussions because there has been no ‘violation of a person’s right to
autonomous self-determination’, as long as ‘real’ consent is given.
The literature critiquing R v Brown written from a gay male (and arguably a
patriarchal perspective), has been extensive in the intervening years. Stychin for
example, argues that R v Brown is a good example of how the law ‘pathologises gay
male sexuality’. Whilst it is relatively straightforward to find literature about R v
Brown and BDSM from a gay male perspective (be it negative or positive), it is not
so straightforward to find lesbians anywhere within mainstream literature, let alone
from a BDSM perspective. One might argue that the ‘standard’ undergraduate texts
books might provide a reasonable overview of the extent to which lesbian existence
is acknowledged. For example, in Herring’s Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and
Materials (Herring 2014), there are seven uses of the word ‘homosexual’ compared
to the word ‘‘lesbian which is used once and simply states ‘lesbian sexual behaviour
has not been the subject of specific prohibition under the criminal law.’’ (Herring
2014: 3). In Herring’s Criminal Law (Herring 2013), there are two instances where
the word ‘homosexual’ is used and zero for ‘lesbian’. In Smith and Hogan’s
Criminal law (Ormerod 2011) the word ‘homosexual’ is used eleven times; the
word ‘gay’ is used five times and not at all for lesbian. In Criminal Law by Than and
Heaton (de Than and Heaton 2013), the word homosexual is used five times; gay is
used once and lesbian zero. Similar treatment is found in Michael Allen’s Textbook
on Criminal Law (Allen 2013), where there are zero references to lesbian; zero for
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gay and eight for homosexual. In Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and
Doctrine (Simester and Spencer 2013), there are six references to homosexual; three
for gay and zero for lesbian. A more socio-legal book such as Quick, Lacey and
Wells’ Reconstructing Criminal Law, never the less however makes zero references
to lesbians in the index; 13 references to ‘homosexuality’, and zero for ‘gay’. This
adds up to a total of 52 references for ‘homosexual/homosexuality’; 9 for ‘gay’ and I
for ‘lesbian’. Other books which have contributed in significant ways to the debates
surrounding gay men and homosexuality include one of the first books in English to
give extensive coverage of gay men and the law; Crane’s Gays and the Law,4 which
focused on gay men due to ‘lesbians’ relative invisibility under English law.’
(Murphy 2000). Moran’s excellent book The Homosexual(ity) of Law (Moran 1996)
represented an important intervention in the scholastic field. It deals almost
exclusively with gay men. Carl Stychin’s Law’s Desire: Sexuality and the Limits of
Justice (Stychin 1995), contains three references to lesbians in the index, but only
one of these three references actually specifically addresses lesbians (as opposed to
‘lesbians and gay men’), in the main body of the text (Stychin 1995: 142). The
recently published Consultation Paper by the Law Commission ‘Reform of Offences
against the Person,5 proposes to reform the law of consent (central to the debate of
legality in BDSM), but specifically excludes consent in sexual situations. The report
states that ‘copious’ amounts of academic work has been conducted in the area of
consent to sexual acts and it specifically cites several articles as representative of
that body of work. It is not just lesbians who make no appearance in the Law
Commission’s research. Of the four articles cited by the Law Commission, there are
zero uses of the word ‘gay’; zero uses of the word ‘lesbian’ and three for
‘homosexual’.6 These are not criticisms, merely observations. There are some
exceptions, Ken Plummer’s wonderful work, Modern Homosexulities; Fragments of
Lesbian and Gay Experience, does include several chapters which focus exclusively
or predominantly upon lesbians, although only two of the chapters deal with
lesbians existence and sexuality outside of the realm of marriage, families and
motherhood. Jeffrey Weeks’ important work Coming Out: homosexual politics in
Britain from the nineteenth century to the present (Weeks 1979) includes 37 pages
on lesbian history.
It might be hoped that if so called ‘conventional’ textbooks do not address
lesbians, perhaps those books which are written from the perspective of women and/
or those that can be labelled feminist would be more inclusive? Works that could
legitimately be described as ground-breaking and significant have also failed to
devote much space to lesbian issues. In Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics, ‘lesbianism’
appears on two pages (336–337), footnoted and stating rather depressingly that
‘‘whatever its potentiality in sexual politics, female homosexuality is currently so
4 London: Pluto Press, 1982.
5 Law Commission (2014) Consultation Paper No 217, at page 19. The articles cited are; D Kell, ‘‘Social
Disutility and Consent’’ (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 121; M Giles, ‘‘Consensual Harm and
the Public Interest’’ (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 101; N Bamforth, ‘‘Sadomasochism and Consent’’
[1994] Criminal Law Review 661; P Murphy, ‘‘Flogging live complainants and dead horses: we may no
longer need to be in bondage to Brown’’ [2011] Criminal Law Review 758.
6 Giles mentions ‘homosexual once’ whilst Murphy uses the term twice.
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dead an issue that while male homosexuality gains a grudging tolerance, in women
the event is observed in scorn or silence.’’ (Millett 1971). Fredman’s otherwise
important book Women and the Law (Fredman 1998) uses the word ‘lesbian’ once.
Bridgeman and Milns Feminist Perspectives on Law (in all other respects, an
excellent book), contains just two references to lesbians in the index and these refer
to families and reproductive technology. Carol Smart’s Feminism and the Power of
Law (Smart 1989) contains two references in the index to ‘lesbianism’. Again, there
are some exceptions. For example, whilst Hilaire Barnett’s Introduction to Feminist
Jurisprudence (Barnett 1998), makes a single reference to ‘lesbian feminism’ in the
index, there are 11 incidents where the word ‘lesbian’ is used in the main text. In
Feminist and Queer Theory (Fineman, Jackson and Romero 2009), lesbians receive
three mentions in the index (one in relation to motherhood; one in relation to
parenting and one in relation to pornography), however lesbians are not discussed
qua lesbians apart from a small part of one chapter which discusses them in the
context of motherhood and families.
The absence of lesbians from scholarship is not of course limited to academic
work. To a large extent, feminist literature generally has similarly consistently
failed to incorporate and account for lesbian existence and experiences. Although
there are of course scholars who have specifically addressed the partial visibility of
lesbians and the representation of lesbians, they have done so whilst recognising
that these categories are both contingent and fragile (Rubin 1984). Calhoun for
example, has explored the non-recognition of lesbian existence suggesting that
feminist studies has failed to capture lesbian difference because it has not ‘‘begun
with a full-blown theory of heterosexist oppression fully parallel to race and class
oppression’’ (Calhoun 1995: 29). Other studies have set out to deliberately include
lesbians; a good example of this is the article by Auchmuty, Jeffreys and Miller who
point out that ‘even today lesbian history tends to be found in separate monographs
… rather than integrated into more general feminist historical accounts’ (Auchmuty
et al. 1992: 91). The lack of attention (especially by early) feminist discourse paid to
lesbian subjective experience, (largely driven by the myth that one oppressed group
cannot in turn oppress another), meant that early feminism centred its discourse on
the patriarchal nature of male-female relationships, at the expense of critical
examination of the heterosexual imperative. Because early feminism operated on
the basis of essentialist meanings of male and female, the only ‘path’ of resistance
was to reverse the present day assumptions, i.e., making women ‘superior’ to men.
The lack of attention paid by much of feminism in the early 1970s to the
assumptions and constructions upon which the compulsory nature of heterosexuality
rests meant that:
[T]hey risked accepting that being heterosexual was an essential part of their
being, and in this way were demonstrably less willing to consider the
possibility that sexual orientation is itself a social construct, rendered
meaningless if social and ideological punishments and rewards associated
with illicit and licit forms of sexual expression were removed (Whelehan
1995: 92).
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In other words, the omission to critically address the construction of a
compulsory form of heterosexuality resulted in a failure to examine and thereby
expose the ideological and hierarchical construction of sexuality constructed as
normatively and exclusively, heterosexual. It is only recently, that ‘second wave’
feminism has largely left biological determinism behind and turned instead to social
constructionism, extending this to the sexual domain. Even so, there still appears to
be a continuing lack of attention paid to the impact of the heterosexual imperative.
For example, Tong only includes lesbians within a separate discussion of radical
feminist thought (Tong 1992). One of the earliest books of feminist history makes
only one mention of lesbians (Rowbotham 1973). In contrast, Rich has
demonstrated the social construction and enforcement of compulsory heterosexu-
ality (Rich 1980), and observed that the institution of heterosexuality holds sway
over all women regardless of their sexual choices—which in fact, have little to do
with ‘choice’ as such. Because of the assumption of a ‘normality’ deemed to be
inherent in heterosexual existence, the socio-legal control over female identity
continues. In a variety of ways, lesbians have been socially constructed as
‘outsiders’ to the law and society and invariably these constructions have been
negative (Kitzinger 1987). Thus, there is a need for heterosexual feminists ‘to
examine heterosexuality as a political institution which disempowers women—and
to change it’ (Rich 1980: xii).
The failure to acknowledge lesbian existence matters. It has significant
consequences. The disputes that surround sexual behaviour have significant
symbolic importance and ‘‘often become the vehicles for displacing social
anxieties.’’ (Rubin 1999: 143). Law exists to exercise control over individuals or
alter their behaviour. As a system of control, it therefore rewards or punishes in
accordance with obedience or disobedience to a certain set of rules. The laws
relating to unacceptable sexual expression or behaviours are no exception to this.
Indeed, concerns surrounding sexual morality are often at the forefront of the law
making process. However, as I have suggested above, it is predominantly gay men’s
sexual expression which has come under the legal gaze. If lesbians do not speak of
their erasure from legal discourse and from legal existence, they disappear. Rich
sums this up as follows;
Whatever is unnamed, undepicted in images, whatever is omitted from
biography, censored in collections of letters, whatever in misnamed as
something else, made difficult-to-come-by, whatever is buried in memory by
the collapse of meaning under an inadequate or lying language – this will
become, not merely unspoken, but unspeakable [emphasis in original] (Rich
1995: 199).
Rich suggests that it is not just invisibility which presents a problem, but that
lesbian identity and existence is in danger of becoming unspeakable. However, I
wish to take this analysis a little further by suggesting that a police discovery of a
lesbian BDSM dungeon and any subsequent trial will render some aspects of lesbian
identity distortedly visible and speakable in some aspects, whilst simultaneously
continuing to render other aspects of lesbian identity invisible. There is a danger that
if the lesbian BDSM dungeon is discovered by law, the legal processes that are
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activated by this discovery (arrest; investigation, charge, prosecution, trial,
sentencing), will construct some of the women as being able to give ‘real’ consent
and the others as violent transgressors of the rules of gender performativity and
therefore, of criminality. The difference would be determined by those who ‘gave’
and those who ‘received’. It is clear therefore, that the issue of ‘genuine’ or ‘real’
consent (Cowan 2012) is an important site of contestation, and it is to this issue that
I now turn.
(Lesbian) Consent
I have argued above that the expression of female sexuality receives different legal
attention than does the expression of male sexuality and that women who therefore
engage in an activity which to them is sexual, but to law is violence, may very well
be subjected to different normative control. Part of this different normative control
relates to the issue of consent. I suggest that some of the lesbians in the fictitious
BDSM dungeon will be constructed as being able to give ‘real’ consent, whilst the
others will be constructed as violent transgressors of the rules of gender
performativity and therefore, of criminality. The crucial difference would be
determined by those who ‘gave’ and those who ‘received’. This fictitious lesbian
BDSM case would be viewed through the lens of hetero-patriarchy; the masochist
would be viewed as performing the ‘normal’ female submissive role in sexual
relations of submission and therefore deemed capable or even expected to give
consent, whilst the sadist would be viewed as usurping the role assigned to her by
heteropatriarchy and would therefore receive legal opprobrium and condemnation.
Indeed, the blogger, writing under the pseudonym Bitchy Jones, (writing Bitchy
Jones’s Diary), raised similar concerns about the issues of pleasure, desire and
consent. The blog was written by a dominatrix who wrote about some of the
problems she saw with the wider BDSM community which she was part of (Barker
2013). Bitchy reveals that regardless of whether men or women are dominant or
submissive, the women engaging in BDSM are expected to conform to normative
ideas of beauty in ways that men are not (Barker 2013: 24). Indeed, Bitchy suggests
that the;
[P]ractices that dominatrices mostly engage with are those that are desired by
submissive men rather than those they want themselves. And she argues that
the idea of female sexual fluidity reproduces the idea of women responding to
men’s desires rather than having desires of their own: that their only allowed
pleasure is in being desired. She links this to the way in which women who are
paid for sex (pro dommes and escorts) have become the cultural role models of
what empowered female sexuality should look like, both within and outside
her community (Barker 2013: 24).
Unfortunately, the Bitchy Jones no longer blogs for the post. In deciding not to
continue with the blog, Bitchy Jones declared that ‘‘Kink’s broken. I hate it. I don’t
really want to play. Something inside me does, but that something is trapped inside
the meat of me that hates all this fucking pornified, PVC clad, patriarchy eroticising
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bullshit.’’ (Bitchy Jones’s Diary 2010). Indeed, as suggested by Dymock, the reason
for the discontinuation of the blog was because ‘‘kink is not protected from the
normalising effects of the commercialisation of sex, it loses a validity and
authenticity that it might have otherwise.’’ (Dymock 2012: 55).
At the core of the R v Brown case was whether or not a person can consent to
harm and how far the State should go in limiting that individuals freedom to consent
to harm. This is an issue which has been raised in many different cases and areas of
law.7 At the core of the argument in favour of BDSM is that made by John Stuart
Mill who argued that the only purpose;
[F]or which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant… Over himself, over his own
body and mind, the individual is sovereign (Mill 1859, 1974: 13).
Mills’ version of liberty is one that is encouraging of individualism although Mill
himself accepts that there is an on-going tension between liberty and authority. In
this context then, Mills argument would suggest that if ‘real’ consent is given, then
there should be no state interference or criminal repercussions because there has
been no ‘‘violation of a person’s right to autonomous self-determination’’ (Weait
and Hunter 2010: 243). Assuming that lesbians are ‘‘rational, choosing agents’’
(Cowan 2012: 3), capable of giving ‘real’ consent, attempts to restrict lesbian
BDSM are therefore oppressive. However, Mill also accepted that there may very
well be cases where it is legitimate to limit an individual’s freedom in their long
term interests and in illustrating this point, he gives the example of a person who
wants to sell themselves into slavery, arguing that a person should not be permitted
to do so because ‘‘the principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not
to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom’’ (Mill 1859, 1974:
236). It was within this context that the court in R v Brown argued that the men
posed a danger to society and therefore might cause harm to others. In the fictional
lesbian dungeon, the State might seek to justify its actions on the basis that there are
two legitimate aims to be pursued; firstly to protect those persons who are deemed
‘vulnerable’ and secondly, to protect the rest of society from those individuals who
do not perform their sexual desires within narrowly constructed ideas of appropriate
sexual expression. Arguably, all lesbians fall within the category of ‘inappropriate’
sexual expression, but those lesbians who are dominant within a BDSM context, are
more likely to receive negative legal attention than those who are submissive. Since
R v Brown, the State has used the concept of ‘‘vulnerability as a way of justifying
criminalisation’’ (Cowan 2012). In other words, any restrictions on BDSM can be
justified by the State on the basis of upholding its particular vision of (presumed and
particular) moral values.
For some, BDSM can only be understood within the broader context of
patriarchal social structures which support male authority, and the unequal power
7 See for example the Wolfendon Report; ‘Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and
Prostitution’, Cmnd 247 (HMSO: London, 1957); the Hart/Devlin debate; H. L. A. Hart, Law Liberty and
Morality (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1968).
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relations between men and women. In other words, BDSM sex is ‘bad’ sex (Rubin
1999), and is primarily motivated by patriarchal power and dominance, not sexual
pleasure or desire. Viewed from this perspective, lesbians who participate in BDSM
activities are imitating inherently unequal heterosexual sexual practices. For others,
the debate centred on the notion that lesbians who engage in BDSM are providing a
site of resistance to hetero-patriarchy and the ‘‘transgressive opportunities that it
provides mean that it enables women (whether lesbian or heterosexual) to assert
their sexual agency.’’ (Weait and Hunter 2010: 245). The issues raised by these
debates are relevant to the lesbian BDSM dungeon. I favour the idea that lesbians
can exercise agency in giving genuine consent, and that as such, lesbian BDSM can
provide a site of resistance to dominant hegemony. I suggest here that expressions
of lesbian sexuality should, (however manifested), be encouraged as a site of
resistance to the ongoing hetero-patriarchal pressure to condemn and stigmatize
lesbian sexual pleasures. Within this context therefore, lesbian BDSM gives
lesbians a distinct physical presence which refuses to pander to the heterosexual
preference for lesbians to remain discreetly invisible (Nestle 1988: 100). Calhoun
suggests that contrary to appearance, lesbians who engage in BDSM do not;
[C]onflict with feminist goals, because it substantially differs from hetero-
sexual male-dominant, female-subordinate sexual relations which also eroti-
cize violence. Because lesbians belong to the same sexual caste, lesbian SM
occurs outside of the larger frame of gender inegalitarian relations, and
because the lesbian masochist consents to and controls the scene, she retains
the right to determine what happens to her body (Calhoun 1995: 15).
For some however, Lesbians who take part in BDSM activities can’t give ‘real’
consent to receive because they are subconsciously mimicking the inherently
unequal patriarchal and heterosexual practices of dominance and submission. In
other words, heterosexual sexual relations are personified by oppression, ‘ritualised
power differentials’ and patriarchal assumptions (O’Sullivan 1999: 99). As argued
by MacKinnon, because genders are ‘created through the eroticization’ of
dominance and submission, it is not possible to know whether or not a woman
who on the face of it apparently enjoys forced sex or coercion, does so because she
has been conditioned by patriarchy to view her sexuality in a masochistic way
(MacKinnon 1989).
In this context, discourse analysis would suggest that it is the performance of
gender which creates the ‘meaning’ given to legal and social practices. The work of
Jacques Derrida, Michael Foucault and Judith Butler have contributed in significant
ways to the analysis of the importance of discourse analysis. Within this post-
structuralist context, women and men are ‘regarded as constructions or represen-
tations, achieved through discourse, performance and repetition rather than being
‘real’ entities’ (Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: xii). Butler’s conception of gender is
perhaps the most radical of all, taking as she does a Foucauldian model, and
asserting that all identity categories ‘‘are in fact the effects of institutions, practices,
discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin’’ (Butler 1990: ix). Whilst it
may be relatively simple on the face of it to agree with John Stuart Mill’s ‘no harm’
principle (discussed above), this presupposes a genuine equality between the
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participants. Feminist discourse analysis suggests that the performance of gender
roles is constructed to engender a societal and legal inequality as between males and
females (Butler 1990). Consequently therefore, where inequality exists, any BDSM
activity is performed through this lens of inequality and there is therefore no ‘real’
or genuine consent. However, do the same or similar considerations apply when
discussing BDSM between lesbians as opposed to BDSM when practices between
heterosexuals? If gender identity is constructed through the prism of hetero-
normative patriarchy, then it is logical that the answer to this question is ‘yes’. I
submit that it is extremely problematic to claim that lesbian BDSM successfully
resists heteronormative and patriarchal imperatives for the sole reason that the
participants are lesbians. Being a lesbian does not in and of itself release one from
the dominant social and legal constructions of gender performativity, although it
may very well provide a potential site of and for, resistance to these ideological and
practical norms.
Many authors (Linden et al 1982) commonly take a position that one cannot be
both a sadomasochist and a feminist. The term lesbian sadomasochist is therefore a
contradiction in terms. Lesbians who take part in BDSM activities are therefore
copying inherently unequal heterosexual practices and perpetuating the ‘‘values of
the patriarchal ruling class, whose stock-in-trade is dominance and submission’’
(Meredith 1982: 97). Indeed, heterosexual desire can still be found in lesbian
relationships because heterosexual oppression will still be present even where
another gender is absent ‘otherness can be reintroduced … through the practice of
sadomasochism or role playing.’’ (Jeffreys 1990: 301). In particular, lesbian BDSM
represents a ‘false consciousness’ representing an ‘‘internalization of a homophobic
heterosexual view of lesbians.’’ (Russell 1982: 176). Sexuality is not immune to
these forces. Thus sexual expression has been constructed by hetero-patriarchy. As
Phelps succinctly argues;
[S]o all-pervasive is the male bias of our culture that we seldom notice that the
fantasies we take in, the images that describe to us how to act, are male
fantasies about females. In a male world, female sex is from the beginning
unable to get a clear picture of itself (Phelps 1972: 13).
It is clear therefore that the issue of consent is a problematic concept. For some,
since there is mutual consent, there is no problem; consenting adults engaging in
truly consenting sexual activity should be of no interest to society or to law (Thorn
2012 and Hornsby 1999). Supposing for a brief moment that lesbians were capable
of giving ‘real’ consent to BDSM; this, in and of itself does not mean that it is not
oppressive. There are many women for example who have consented to be married
to a man and whilst these women might argue that they were able to give ‘real’
consent to the marriage, this does not mean that marriage is non-oppressive. The
consent given in lesbian BDSM does not necessarily or automatically mean that the
heterosexual power dynamics have been overcome (Butler 1982). However, as
Rubin points out BDSM is not an obvious site at which the possibility of consent has
been compromised (Rubin 1987: 224).
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A post-structuralist approach for example, would argue that all meanings
associated with identities or sexual practices are the result of social and legal
construction in a complex dialectical way.
Conclusion
In the light of these concerns therefore, I suggest that a way forward is to steer a
path through both ‘sides’ of the argument through a successful overlapping of post-
structuralism and liberalism. Part of this solution lies in an adaptation of Plummer’s
call for ‘‘notions of national citizenship’’.8 Sometimes, ‘particular groups with
sharply defined boundaries’ are necessary (Wolfe 1992: 311–312). Given this, the
criminal law should not only seek to acknowledge the existence of lesbians, but
strive to do so outside of the category of ‘lesbianandgaymen’. Further, the criminal
law needs to carefully consider whether there can be ‘real’ consent in lesbian BDSM
cases and give consideration to the unequal distribution of power. These
considerations should rightly be of significant and legitimate concern to the state.
Whilst I have great sympathy for the argument that lesbian BDSM is driven by
heteronormative and patriarchal concerns, I do not think that this justifies the notion
that limits should exist in law in which the activities of lesbian BDSM practices are
constrained because these choices are not ‘real’ but instead shaped by hetero-
patriarchal normativity. As I have suggested above, if there were to be case of
lesbian BDSM that was prosecuted in the courts, my suggestion is that it would be
the sadist rather than the masochist which would attract attention. Viewed through
the lens of hetero-patriarchy, the masochist would be viewed as performing the
‘normal’ female submissive role in sexual relations (reflecting the disappointing
amount of times I still get asked ‘which one of you is the man?’). The sadist on the
other hand is more likely to attract legal opprobrium and condemnation, usurping as
she does her allocated role of submissive; to be dominant and in control is not the
role that hetero-patriarchy has assigned to her.
Whilst there has been some progression in terms of legal sexual morality, there
have also been retrograde steps taken in this area. There should be significant
concerns over the new regulations that came into force on 1st December 2014. The
Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2014 amends the 2003 Communications
Act and applies to content created in the UK. The content of all Video on Demand
(VoD) services is no longer permissible if it cannot be classified as an R18,
according to guidelines laid out by the British Board of Film Censors (BBFC).
There is a significantly long list of sexual activities that will now fall foul of these
guidelines. These include; spanking; caning; aggressive whipping; penetration by
any object ‘associated with violence’; physical or verbal abuse (regardless if
consensual); urolagnia; female ejaculation; strangulation; facesitting and fisting. If
female ejaculation on video is now a criminal offence, it is not difficult to see how
this will impact upon lesbians who film the BDSM they are engaging in. There is, of
course no ban on the portrayal of male ejaculation, and there does not appear to be a
8 See also Chatterjee (2012).
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reason given for this. The portrayal of female sexual pleasure has been officially
outlawed. A further concern is scoping exercise that he Law Commission has been
asked to carry out by The Ministry of Justice as a first step towards a potential
project to reform the law on offences against the person. They have made it clear
however, that that the law relating to consent will not be looked at, stating that;
The law concerning the effect of consent on liability for crimes of violence is
extremely complicated and is the subject of a copious academic literature. …
[W]e are not proposing to reform the general principles governing consent in
this project (Law Commission 2014: paragraph 2.55).
This article has argued that lesbian identity in particular, continues to be regarded
and rendered ‘the Other’ and ‘the invisible’, in relation to its position in the network
of heterosexual legal and social power relations. This is even more so within the
context of BDSM. It is important to resist the intrusions of heteropatriarchal power
and embrace the existence of a lesbian identity, albeit one that is constantly in flux.
Resistance to the criminal censure and societal condemnation of BDSM can ‘‘offer
important opportunities for gaining visibility and empowerment’’. It is only by such
resistance can the lesbian subject exist. In order for this resistance to happen, the
lesbian must, by necessity exist as a discursive epistemological subject. However, I
suggest that this has to happen without placing reliance upon essentialist notions of
the knowable subject. There needs to be recognition that there is no discursive
‘knowable’ lesbian essence, but additionally, it also needs to be understood that
there can be pluralities of existence. Whilst essentialism can offer sites of resistance
to dominant hegemony, it has an unattractive claim to the universal subject. Post-
structuralism claims to offer a refutation of that dominant hegemony, but denies the
subject.
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